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Deep-rooted structural factors make Syria prone to sudden convulsions, such as the recent emergence of Hai'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, in English Syria Liberation Organisation). Its 23 million population has a Sunni majority with a significant presence of Shias, Druze and Syrian Christians. Being an ethnic Kaleidoscope has made it vulnerable to sectarian tensions and foreign sponsors' manipulation causing instability since the Crusades in the medieval era. It is at a civilisation faultline straddling three Sunni blocks: Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf, as well as a bridge between Shia-majority Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.
A 13-Year-Long Civil War
The Al-Assad family of the Alawi sect of Shia Islam has ruled Syria for over 50 years. The regime formally professes to Ba'ath party ideology of Pan-Arab nationalism. It has faced Arab Spring's most persistent and bloody politico-military insurrection since 2011, which has killed up to half a million Syrians, displaced 7 million internally and forced 6.4 million into exile abroad from the country's 23.5 million population. The 13-year-long civil war has caused material damage of nearly 500 billion dollars. All this notwithstanding, President Bashar al-Assad's government has tenaciously survived so far, thanks largely to robust military assistance from Russia, Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah militia. His regime has been in control of most of the country for the past five years, keeping at bay at least 49 militias, mostly Sunni outfits holed up in a 4 million-strong Idlib exclusion zone in the northwest bordering Turkey, which protects them. The instability in Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza has also permeated into Syria. While projecting "rejectionism" against Israel, Damascus has been careful to avoid a direct military confrontation despite frequent air attacks. After being ostracised by the Arab League for over a decade, it was invited to rejoin the regional body. Most of the Arab countries have resumed diplomatic ties with Syria, even as Western sanctions continue.
Spasm Of Sunni Salafism
Sunni militancy has been endemic to Syria. But lately, an eerie pattern seems to have set in: the sudden and periodic spasms of Sunni Salafism every decade for the past 20 years: in 2004 it was affected by the scourge of al-Qaeda in neighbouring Iraq, only to be snuffed out two years later by the occupying US forces there. In 2014, the infamous Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) under self-styled Khalifa Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi exploded with a mysterious and gruesome mix of modern military hardware and regressive theocracy. The ISIS quickly overran a swathe of territory bigger than France with Raqqah as its capital and annual revenue of over a billion dollars. After earning notoriety for its medieval conduct, it too was militarily vanquished in 2019 by an unlikely coalition of Iran, the US, Iraqi Shia and Kurdish militias. Though it lost all territorial control, it still managed some spectacular operations hitting Moscow, Afghanistan, etc.
A decade after ISIS, the HTS led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani emerged out of the shadows on November 27 2024, waging a blitzkrieg to shatter the wobbly peace of the past five years. Within a week, it has occupied Aleppo and Hama, Syria's second and fourth largest cities. The HTS leads a motley Sunni rebel coalition poised to march on to Homs and threaten Damascus. In tandem with its advance, the Kurdish Self-Defence Force in the northeast and the Druze population in the south have also asserted against the central authority. Despite HTS claims of coordination, the actions by Kurdish and Druze elements appear autonomous and opportunistic.
The Emergence Of The HTS
The pattern is hardly coincidental. These perennial ethnic frictions manifest at opportune times of weak and unpopular regimes, social vacuum and external sponsors. The violent and toxic movements seek legitimacy through tactical shifts and the use of religious and sectarian symbols, but generate more heat than light and are eventually consumed by their overreach and overzealousness.
The emergence of the HTS has followed this script. It sensed opportunity as the Syrian army was exhausted after 13 years of unrelenting civil war and persistent Israeli air attacks. The lack of any peace dividend and political reforms has left the population disgruntled. Equally importantly, Iran and Russia, Damascus' powerful external backers, each currently have their well-known preoccupations.
The HTS seems to have internalised the failures of the previous two Salafi insurrections. It has tried to cobble together a wider coalition of Sunni militias shunning, at least temporarily, the Salafi dogma it inherited from Al-Nusra Front, its al-Qaeda-aligned previous Avatar. It has also sought to have a modus vivendi with minorities such as Druze, Christians, Kurds, etc. Although proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the UN, the US, Turkey etc., it has, reportedly, been sustained by Ankara and Doha. Possible crowdfunding from other sources, including Syrians in exile (over a quarter of the total population) as well as private largesse from the various Sunni outfits and non-state actors cannot be ruled out.
Bashar al-Assad Has Held On
Despite the HTS' initial shock successes on the ground, it is too early to count out President Bashar al-Assad, who has long defied prophesies of his demise. His battle-hardened and well-equipped army and security agencies are motivated by hard back-to-a-wall survival instinct. While his popularity is uncertain, he has provided a modicum of stability to the country for the past five years. So, for many in Syria, as a familiar devil, he may be preferable to unpredictable vendetta-driven revolutionaries. If push came to shove and Russia and Iran proved unwilling or unable to help out this time, the al-Assad clan retains the manoeuvrability to find new saviours. His last calling card would be that only he can keep Syria together and moderate (notwithstanding the fiery rhetoric) and his departure could lead to anarchy in a fragmented country with warring sectarian cantons that would make Lebanon appear as an oasis of peace. While quite a few of his internal and external detractors may not mind a regime change, very few of them, including the Western countries, Israel and Turkey, would countenance risking Syria being fractured into mutually warring cantons along ethnic or religious lines. The bitter legacy of the 13 years of civil war has thwarted the success of numerous attempts at reconciling the al-Assad regime with its militant opponents, notably through the United Nations and the Asthana process.
In the short run, thus, a "mother of all battles" is shaping up to control crucial central highlands around the Hama-Homs axis. To a large extent, its outcome would depend on which of the two sides would be able to keep their flock together and marshal their respective sponsors' support.
The current flux in Syria can be seen as one of the aftershocks of Israel's pyrrhic but decisive victory over Hamas and Hezbollah during the preceding weeks. It may also be a forerunner for an eventual epic confrontation between Israel and Iran if Tehran loses Syria, its last perch for its "advance defence strategy" against Israel.
Why India Should Be Concerned
Though India may be physically distant from Syria's killing fields, several factors cast a long shadow upon us. Firstly, while Syria itself is not an oil and gas exporter, it lies close to the Gulf, which has major oil and gas reserves. Consequently, developments there are strategically important for us for several reasons, such as our hydrocarbon source, the base for over 9 million Indian expatriates, remittances and the export market. Protracted instability in Syria can therefore affect our vital interests. It is less well known that over 4 million Indians, mostly Malayalis, belong to the Syrian Christian church, constituting more than half of its global adherents. This symbiotic confessional connection makes them important stakeholders in the emerging imbroglio. Thirdly, the last time Syria faced a similar Salafi breakout by ISIS a decade ago, it "inspired" a small but significant segment of Indian Muslims. Some even answered its siren call to travel to Syria to join ISIS as Jihadis. A few cases of terror perpetrated in India were eventually traced to ISIS instigation. A bout of instability in Syria is, therefore, not conducive to India's security and domestic stability. All these aspects enjoin us to keep a careful watch on the ongoing Syrian developments and act preventively to safeguard our national interests.
(The author is a retired Indian Ambassador who learnt the Arabic language in Damascus. He currently heads Eco-Diplomacy and Strategies, a Delhi-based consultancy.)